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Abstract
Deep neural network is the main research branch in artificial intelligence
and suitable for many decision-making fields. Autonomous driving and un-
manned vehicle often depend on deep neural networks for accurate and re-
liable detection, classification, and ranging of surrounding objects in real
on-road environments, either locally or by swarm intelligence among dis-
tributed nodes via 5G channel. But, it has been demonstrated that deep
neural networks are vulnerable to well-designed adversarial examples that
are imperceptible to human eyes in computer vision tasks. It is valuable
to study the vulnerability for enhancing the robustness of neural networks.
However, existing adversarial examples against object detection models are
image-dependent, so in this paper, we implement adversarial attacks against
object detection models using universal perturbations. We find the cross-
task, cross-model, and cross-dataset transferability of universal perturba-
tions, we train universal perturbations generator firstly and then add the
universal perturbations to the target images in two ways: resizing and pile-
up, in order to solve the problem that universal perturbations cannot be
directly applied to attack object detection models. We use the transferabil-
ity of universal perturbations to attack black-box object detection models. In
this way, the time cost of generating adversarial examples is reduced. A se-
ries of experiments are conducted on PASCAL VOC and MS COCO datasets
demonstrating the feasibility of cross-task attacks and proving the e↵ective-
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ness of our attack on two representative object detectors: regression-based
models like YOLOv3 and proposal-based models like Faster R-CNN.
Keywords:
Adversarial example, Object detection, Universal perturbation
1. Introduction
As one of the most incredibly influential parts of Artificial Intelligence
(AI), Deep Neural Network (DNN) is designed to mimic the network of neu-
rons that makes up a human brain so that computers will understand things
and make decisions in a human-like manner. It has been widely applied in
people’s life, such as unmanned vehicles, autonomous driving, monitoring
security [1, 2, 3], and so on. An important and challenging application of
DNN is performing real-time object detection to help a camera locate in-
stances of semantic objects of a certain class [4, 5, 6, 7], and recognize each
physical shape [8] as humans do. Some of the detection decisions are made
locally, and the others are shared among distributed vehicles or uploaded to
the cloud via broadband 5G channel for coordination and supervision since
the detection results are very critical for the safety of autonomous driving.
However, recent studies have shown that deep learning models are highly sus-
ceptible to adversarial perturbations [9]. The adversarial images can cause
serious tra c accidents. For example, if the adversarial stop sign is not rec-
ognized correctly, the autonomous driving vehicle will not stop. So, it is
worthy studying the attack technologies deeply for enhancing the robustness
and security of neural networks and autonomous driving. Szegedy et al. [10]
first propose the vulnerability of deep learning models in the field of image
classification, that is, adding carefully created perturbations can cause the
image classifier to misclassify input images with extremely high confidence,
while the same perturbation can fool multiple image classifiers. Then, FGSM
[11], C&W [12], and Decision-Based Attack [13] are proposed to attack DNNs
based image classifiers. To save the time cost in training adversarial exam-
ples, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [14] and Mopuri et al. [15] propose universal
adversarial perturbations against image classifiers. Meanwhile, more and
more methods are presented to attack other tasks, for example, Chen et al.
[16], Xie et al. [17], and Wei et al. [18] design attacks on object detections.
Object detection is a fundamental task of AI in computer vision and thus
has broad applications like tra c sign recognition, face retrieval, and so on.
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In addition, the object detection algorithm has made great breakthroughs in
recent years. The most popular algorithms can be divided into two categories.
One is proposal-based algorithms (R-CNN [19], Fast R-CNN [20], Faster R-
CNN [21], etc.). They are two-stage models and need to generate candidate
box first, then classify and return the candidate box. The other is regression-
based methods such as YOLO [22], YOLO9000 [23], YOLOv3 [24] and SSD
[25], which use a convolutional neural network to directly predict the category
and location of di↵erent objects. Proposal-based models are accurate but
slow, regression-based models are faster but the accuracy is lower.
The operation of DNN of AI depends on the training process and it
has vulnerability as mentioned above. The object detection models are
also vulnerable to adversarial examples. At present, some attack methods
against object detection models have been proposed. Xie et al. [17] propose
optimization-based Dense Adversary Generation (DAG) and successfully at-
tack Faster R-CNN. Wei et al. [18] propose Unified and E cient Adversary
(UEA) to attack both proposal-based models and regression-based models.
Xin et al. [26] propose a DPATCH which is added to the top left corner of the
input images to deceive object detectors. However, the adversarial examples
generated by DAG and UEA are image-dependent, so it will spend a lot of
time training adversarial examples, and DPATH is so obvious for defenders
to find out that it is a modified image.
To address these issues, in this paper, we propose to use the transferabil-
ity of universal perturbations generated against image classification tasks
to attack both proposal-based and regression-based object detection mod-
els. We leverage generic representations learned by VGG16 [27], VGG19 and
Densenet169 [28] and a generator trained on ImageNet dataset to construct
transferable universal adversarial perturbations. Then add the universal per-
turbations by resizing and pile-up to attack object detectors.
This paper is an extended version of a previous conference paper [29]. In
our previous work, we used ResNet architecture generator to train universal
perturbations against the VGG16 model and used them to attack YOLOv3
and Faster R-CNN detectors in order to verify the transferability of the
universal perturbations, and we used 40 images to evaluate the attack e↵ect.
Compared to the conference version, we change the quantity and architecture
of generators, the structure and depth of the target models used in the train-
ing process, and the test dataset, etc. In summary, the main contributions
(novel contributions highlighted in bold) of this work can be summarized as
follows:
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• We discover the cross-task, cross-model, and cross-dataset
transferability of universal perturbations and use them to
attack object detection systems. Universal perturbations
trained against classification models can be used to attack
object detection models.
• We succeed in implementing cross-task, cross-model, and
cross-dataset black-box attacks using the transferability of
universal perturbations.
• We use two di↵erent methods, resizing and pile-up, to solve
the problem of perturbations and target images size mis-
match, successfully attack both proposal-based and regression-
based object detectors.
• We explore the attack e↵ect of the universal pertur-
bations generated by di↵erent architecture genera-
tors like ResNet and recursive U-Net.
• We explore the attack e↵ect of universal pertur-
bations generated against di↵erent structure target
models like VGG model and Densenet model and
target models with the same structure but not the
same depth like VGG16 and VGG19.
• We significantly increase the number of target im-
ages to test the attack e↵ect of the universal per-
turbations and replace a more appropriate measure-
ment.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: we introduce some related
works for object detection models and adversarial attack methods in Section
2. In Section 3, we propose our approaches to generate universal perturba-
tions and attack object detectors. After that, the setup and results of our
experiments are presented in Section 4. Finally, we draw the conclusions of
our entire work.
2. Related Work
In some aspects, we usually don’t know the target model’s architecture,
hyper-parameters, and dataset used during training, so we hope to find a
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universal perturbation that can fool object detectors. In addition, We not
only hope that we can generate perturbations fast but also hope that the
generated perturbations have good attack e↵ects. The related work comes
from three aspects: object detection models, universal perturbations, and
adversarial attacks for object detectors.
2.1. Object Detection Models
Object detection is an important branch of computer vision. It is widely
used in intelligent driving, tra c sign recognition, face retrieval, and behavior
recognition. In simple terms, object detection is object recognition and object
location. At present, object detection models are mainly divided into two
categories: one-stage models like YOLOv3 and SSD, two-stage models like
R-CNN, Fast R-CNN, and Faster R-CNN.
2.1.1. Faster R-CNN
In R-CNN, the selective search is used to pre-extract a series of candidate
regions that are more likely to be objects. Then use CNN to extract features
on these candidate regions for detection. R-CNN needs to extract features
for each region proposal, which takes too much time. Fast R-CNN adds RoI
pooling layers to the network and uses a multi-task loss function to speed up
the detection speed. Faster R-CNN uses region proposal network instead of
selective search, and the entire network can share the feature information ex-
tracted by the convolutional neural network, which saves computational cost
and solves the problem that the Fast R-CNN algorithm generates candidate
frames in a slow way.
2.1.2. YOLOv3
YOLO means “you only look once”, that is, object location and classifi-
cation are completed in one step. YOLO uses the entire graph as the input
of the network and directly returns the position of the bounding box and
its category at the output layer. YOLOv2 adds batch normalization to the
network and removes the fully connected layer, improving the accuracy of
recognition. YOLOv3 uses multi-scale prediction to improve the detection
accuracy of small objects.
2.2. Universal perturbations
2.2.1. Universal Adversarial perturbations
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [14] first propose the concept of universal pertur-
bations. They have shown that adding a fixed-size general perturbation to
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the original image can have a deceptive e↵ect on the pre-trained image classi-
fier. However, this method actually superimposes multiple image-dependent
perturbations and then crops them to obtain universal perturbations. Dur-
ing the perturbation generation, the original image still needs to be used as
input, so their method cannot be used in a black-box environment.
2.2.2. Fast Feature Fool
Mopuri et al. [15] propose a method that do not rely on the original
images to generate perturbations. They add perturbations to the input to
a↵ect the feature extraction of the next layer, and the cumulative e↵ect will
lead to a wrong prediction in the last layer. However, it can’t be applied to
attack object detectors directly.
2.3. Attacks Against Object Detectors
2.3.1. DAG
Currently, adversarial attacks for object detection models are rare. Xie et
al. [17] propose an optimization-based method called Dense Adversary Gen-
eration (DAG) to attack object detectors. They choose Faster R-CNN as the
target model, and specify the object class on the proposal regions and then
generate adversarial examples by optimizing the loss function. Therefore,
DAG needs many iterations to generate adversarial examples. In addition,
adversarial examples generated using the DAG method are image-dependent.
2.3.2. DPATCH
Xin et al. [26] propose an attack method called DPATCH to cripple
the object detectors by adding an adversarial patch in the original images.
Firstly, they add a randomly-initialized DPATCH to the image, and they
update the pixels of DPATH during back-propagation. DPATCH’s attack
e↵ect is independent of where it is placed. It can deceive Faster R-CNN and
YOLO, but its patch is too obvious to be imperceptible, and it needs a very
large number of iterations.
To solve the above problems, we add universal perturbations to object
detection datasets in two ways: resizing and pile-up, and use the transferabil-
ity of universal perturbations to attack both proposal-based Faster R-CNN





In this paper, we implement black-box adversarial attacks against object
detectors, hoping to successfully attack the object detectors and reduce the
mean average precision (mAP). mAP is a measure of the detection result
of the object detectors. The higher the value, the better the performance
of the detectors. mAP is the average value of APs of various classes of
objects in the datasets, and AP is the average value of precision of a class
on di↵erent recalls. Precision measures the accuracy of the detector, that
is, the probability that the actual positive example is detected as a positive
example by the detector, and recall measures the recall of the detector, that
is, the probability that the positive sample is actually detected as a positive
example. mAP can measure the detection e↵ect of all examples in a large
dataset, so it is usually used as the detection measure of object detectors.
The black-box means that we can only obtain the input and output results
of the target models, but not the internal network structure and weights of
the target models, the training set used in the training process, the setting
of parameters during the training process and other internal information.
White-box means that the attacker can obtain all the information of the
target models. The di↵erences between black-box attacks and white-box
attacks are shown in Table 1:
For the attacks of the black-box models, we cannot use the gradient of the
neural network to perform iterative calculations to generate adversarial ex-
amples, so we consider using the transferability of perturbations to attack the
black-box object detectors. Image-dependent adversarial perturbations con-
sume a lot of time in the calculation process, so in order to reduce the attack
time and generate a large number of adversarial examples in a short time,
we consider using universal perturbations to complete the attack process.
Because the size of the target images is di↵erent, the universal perturbations
cannot be directly used to attack the object detectors. Therefore, we propose
to use two methods: resizing and pile-up, to solve the problem that the size
of universal perturbations does not match the size of the target images. In
the next, we will introduce the generation process of universal perturbations
and how to use the transferability of the universal perturbations to attack
object detectors.
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Table 1: The di↵erences between black-box attacks and white-box attacks
Attributes black-box attack white-box attack
Network
structure
Unable to get the network
structure of the target model
The network structure of the
target model can be obtained
Internal
parameters
Unable to get the parameters
and weights of the neural net-
work of the target model
The parameters and weights of
the neural network of the tar-
get model can be obtained
Training
dataset
Unable to get the dataset used
during the training process of
the target model
The dataset used during the
training process of the target
model can be obtained
Network
gradient
Unable to generate adversar-
ial examples by calculating the
gradient of the neural network
The adversarial examples can
be generated by calculating the




Can only obtain the input and
output of the target model,
and adversarial examples are
generated by querying
The internal information of the
target model can be obtained,
and the adversarial examples
can be generated by iterative
calculation
3.2. Universal perturbations
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [14] discovered the existence of universal pertur-
bations. They used an iterative method to generate adversarial perturbations
that misclassified the classifier for each class in the target dataset, and then
superimposed the perturbations and clipped the universal perturbations ac-
cording to the limitation of lp norm. Therefore, the universal perturbation
is a vector that causes all categories to cross their corresponding decision
boundaries. The existence of the universal adversarial perturbations reveals
the geometric correlation of the classifier’s high-dimensional decision bound-
aries, and it is a great threat to AI. When attackers use universal perturba-
tions to implement adversarial attacks, they usually want to train only one
perturbation image to make the classifier misclassify all the classes in the tar-
get images. The universal perturbations can make a classifier misclassify all
classes without a↵ecting the true distribution of the original images, reducing
the time to calculate and generate adversarial examples for each class in the
target images. And the universal perturbations have a good generalization
ability, which is not only across datasets but also across models, and they are
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suitable for adversarial attacks in black-box situations. However, compared
with the image-dependent perturbations, the L1 norm of the universal per-
turbations is larger because of their universality. Generally, the algorithm of
universal perturbations is shown in Algorithm 1:
Algorithm 1 Calculation process of universal perturbations
Input: adversarial perturbation v, image classifier k, target images distri-
bution X, perturbation limitation ✏
Output: universal perturbation v
1: Initial v  0
2: for each xi 2 X do
3: if k(xi + v) = k(xi) then







In this section, we choose Faster R-CNN and YOLOv3 as our target mod-
els, which are representative detectors of proposal-based (two-stage) models
and regression-based (one-stage) models, respectively. Faster R-CNN re-
ceives the entire image as the input of a shared convolutional neural network
to obtain the feature map. The regional proposal network (RPN) completes
the segmentation of the feature map and identifies each foreground and back-
ground of each segmented anchor. Then, it corrects the coordination of the
anchors belonging to the foreground for the first time. The RoI Pooling
Layers select the features corresponding to each RoI on the feature map ac-
cording to the output of the RPN and set the dimension to a fixed value.
Finally, the proposals are classified by a fully connected layer (FC Layer),
and the anchors are modified for the second time. The detection process of
Faster R-CNN is shown in Figure 1:
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Figure 1: The two-stage detection process of proposal-based Faster R-CNN.
YOLOv3 is di↵erent from the two-stage idea of Faster R-CNN that object
classification and object location are performed in two stages. It transforms
the object detection task into a regression problem. Using the whole image
as the input of the network, it directly returns the object frame and the class
of the object in multiple positions of the image. YOLOv3 uses Darknet-53
as the backbone network, and it uses the shortcut-connection in the back-
bone network to ensure that the network can converge normally. It predicts
from three di↵erent feature scales, feature maps at di↵erent scales are fused
through upsampling and concatenation operations to improve small objects
detection e↵ect. The detection process of YOLOv3 is shown in Figure 2:
Figure 2: The one-stage detection process of regression-based YOLOv3.
Both Faster R-CNN and YOLOv3 can be used in tra c sign recognition,
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face detection, and other scenarios. In this paper, we choose pre-trained
Faster R-CNN and pre-trained YOLOv3 as the target models. In order
to meet the black-box scene during the attack process, we do not consider
obtaining the network structure and parameters of these two pre-trained
object detection models, so they are black-box models for us.
3.4. Generation Process of Universal Perturbations
We expect to attack both the proposal-based detector and the regression-
based detector at the same time, so in this paper, we propose to use the
transferability of the universal perturbations proposed by Poursaeed et al.
to attack Faster R-CNN and YOLOv3.
The generation process of the universal perturbations mainly includes a
generator G, a loss function Loss, and a target classification model F . First,
we sample noise z from a random vector that satisfies a uniform distribution.
Then, the generator G takes it as input and outputs perturbation p. If the
perturbation p is larger than the l1 limitation, the perturbation will be scaled
at p⇤ = min(1, L1maximum||G(z)||1 ). Then add the scaled perturbation to the original
image x and get the adversarial sample x0 = x + p. The image classifier F
predicts the adversarial sample x0 and outputs the prediction label l. Finally,
the cross-entropy loss function H(F (x0), lt) is used to measure the distance
between the predicted label l and the least-likely label lt, and the parameters
of the generator model are continuously updated by back-propagation so that
we can get a universal perturbation generator. The loss function is defined
as follows:
Loss = log(H(F (x0), lt)). (1)
3.4.1. Generator Architecture
For the choice of the perturbation generators, in this paper, we use ResNet
and recursive U-Net as the generator architecture to generate universal per-
turbations.
The ResNet generator uses a residual module. The shortcut-connection
structure in the residual block connects the input layer to the subsequent
layers, so the subsequent layers only need to learn the residuals. The convo-
lutional layers and the fully connected layers have the problems of informa-
tion loss during the information transfer process. After using the shortcut-
connection structure, it can deepen the neural network and avoid the decrease
of accuracy caused by the increase of the number of neural network layers.
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The U-Net generator uses a network that includes upsampling and down-
sampling. There is a skip-connection in the U-Net network, which realizes
feature fusion under di↵erent sizes and improves the accuracy of the model.
3.4.2. Perturbation Addition
We add the universal perturbations generated by the generator to the
images in Pascal VOC 2007 test set and MS COCO 2014 validation set to
attack the object detectors. Since the size of perturbation images is smaller
than the size of target images, in order to solve the problem that the universal
perturbations cannot be directly applied to the attack object detectors, we
use two methods to add the perturbation images to the target images: resiz-
ing and pile-up. Resizing means that the perturbation images are adjusted
to the size of the target images, and pile-up means that the perturbation
images are copied and stacked, and then clipped to the size of the target
images. The process is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: The top row adding the perturbation to the original images in a resizing way,
and the bottom row adding the perturbation to the original images in a pile-up way.
The attack process algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 Attack process of universal perturbations
Input: random noise z, generator G, original image x, perturbation limita-
tion ✏
Output: two di↵erent adversarial examples x01 and x
0
2
1: The generator generate perturbation: p = G(z)
2: Resize the perturbation to the size of the target image: p! p1
3: Add the perturbation to the original image: x01 = x+ p1
4: Copy and stack the perturbation, then clip it to the size of the target
image: p! p2
5: Add the perturbation to the original image: x02 = x+ p2




In order to verify the transferability of the universal perturbations, firstly,
we use generators of ResNet architecture and recursive U-Net architecture
to generate the universal perturbations on the first 10 classes of images in
the ImageNet training set. Second, we train the generators with a di↵erent
number of training set images. In this paper, we use the parameter f to
represent the number of images classes used in the training process. When f
= 10, it means that the first ten classes in the training set of the ImageNet
dataset are used. Then, we let f = 50, f = 100, f = 200, f = 500, and f
= 1000 respectively to train the universal perturbation generators of the two
architectures, and observe the attack e↵ect of generated universal perturba-
tions against the two object detectors. In addition, in Figure 4, we describe
the flowchart of the attack process in detail.
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Figure 4: Flowchart of the universal perturbation generation process. We first use a
generator to generate universal perturbation and then add the universal perturbation to
the target image in two ways. On the one hand, we resize the universal perturbation to
the size of the target image and add it to the target image. On the other hand, we pile
up the universal perturbation and crop it to the size of the target image, then add it to
the target image.
Therefore, the inputs of the target models Faster R-CNN and YOLOv3
are adversarial examples that universal perturbations added by resizing and
pile-up, and the outputs are the detection results of the adversarial examples.
The universal perturbations can make the above object detectors misclassifies
or hides some or all of the objects in the original images, thereby reducing
the mAP of the object detectors.
4. Experiments and Evaluation
We conduct two sets of experiments against Faster R-CNN and YOLOv3.




We use ILSVRC 2012, Pascal VOC 2007, and MS COCO 2014 datasets
for our experiments. ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge
(ILSVRC) evaluates algorithms for object detection and image classification
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on a large scale. ILSVRC 2012 dataset is a subset of the ImageNet dataset,
which is a large scale hierarchical image database. MS COCO dataset and
PASCAL VOC dataset are large scale objection detection, segmentation,
and captioning datasets. In our experiment, we chose the MS COCO 2014
validation set as the attack dataset against YOLOv3 and PASCAL VOC
2007 test set as the attack dataset against Faster R-CNN. PASCAL VOC
contains 20 classes of objects, including person, vehicle, animal, accessory,
sports, kitchen, food, furniture, electronic, appliance, the outdoor, and the
indoor. There are 4952 images in the PASCAL VOC 2007 test set. The size
of images in PASCAL VOC is about 500*375 or 375*500, and each image
has its own “.xml” format annotation file. MS COCO contains 80 classes of
objects, which is more comprehensive than PASCAL VOC. There are 40504
images in MS COCO 2014 validation set, and the size of images in MS COCO
is usually larger than that in PASCAL VOC. The annotation of all images
is in a “.json” format file.
4.1.2. Generator Architecture
In our experiment, we use neural networks as generators. For the archi-
tecture of the generators, we use recursive U-Net [30] and ResNet [31] to
explore the e↵ects of di↵erent structures in generating perturbations. The
U-Net architecture is an encoder-decoder network with ship connections be-
tween the encoder and decoder. And ResNet architecture consists of several
downsampling layers, residual blocks, and upsampling layers.
4.1.3. Target Models
In our experiments, we choose Densenet169, VGG16, and VGG19 as our
based models to generate perturbations because they are powerful and widely
used models. And, we choose two representative models: Faster R-CNN and
YOLOv3 as our target models. Faster R-CNN and YOLOv3 are the two
most widely-used object detectors, and they are representatives of the one-
stage and two-stage object detectors, respectively. In the field of autonomous
driving, Faster R-CNN and YOLOv3 are usually used for object detection.
Especially, Faster R-CNN is trained on the PASCAL VOC 2007 training
set and tested on the PASCAL VOC 2007 testing set. YOLOv3 is trained
on the MS COCO 2014 training set and tested on the MS COCO 2014
validation set. In addition, we aim at Faster R-CNN and YOLOv3 to verify
the transferability of the perturbations.
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4.1.4. Experiment Environment
We use the PyTorch 0.4.1 framework on the Linux system to conduct all
the experiments. In addition, we perform our experiments across two Nvidia
GeForce GTX 1080 GPUs with 8 GB memory each.
4.1.5. Evaluation Metrics
We mainly evaluate the performance of perturbations from two aspects.
One is the degradation of the mAP, the other is the norm of the perturbations
added to the original images.
The mAP is mean average precision, the meaning of “mean” is to average
the APs of each class, and AP is the area under the precision-recall curve.
In addition, the precision and the recall are defined as formula 2 and 3
respectively. Generally speaking, the higher the AP value is, the better
the detector is. The size of the mAP must be in the range of [0, 1], the
bigger the mAP is, the better the performance of the object detector is.










We use p-norm to measure the size of the adversarial perturbations, where







In this paper, We use L1, which is the absolute value of the maximum
changing value of the pixel in the adversarial examples, and use mAP degra-
dation amount between original images and adversarial examples to evaluate
our proposed method.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Results on YOLOv3
We use ResNet and recursive U-Net as the generator architecture. Most
of the time is spent in training universal perturbations. The training time
varies according to the number of images used in the training process. It
varies from two hours to seven days. When we complete the training process
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of universal perturbations, we add them to the target images to generate
adversarial examples, which takes 0.4 seconds to generate each adversarial
example on average. Firstly, we resize and pile up the perturbation generated
using the first ten classes of the ImageNet dataset to the size of the input
images. And during the training process of the perturbation generators, we
set L1 = 20.
In the next experiment in the case of L1 = 20, we use the first 50, first
100, first 200, first 500, and 1000 classes of the ImageNet dataset respectively
to train the perturbation generators. Subsequently, we perform resizing op-
eration and pile-up operation on the generated perturbations to add them to
the input images. And the attack e↵ect is shown in Table 2 and Table 3. The
perturbation parameter f represents the number of classes of images used in
the generator training process. Figure 5 depicts the perturbations added to
di↵erent input images.
Table 2: mAP degradation by ResNet generated universal perturbations attack e↵ect
against YOLOv3
Densenet169 VGG16 VGG19
perturbation parameter(f) resize pile-up resize pile-up resize pile-up
f=10 22.1% 29.8% 22.4% 23.2% 22.4% 23.7%
f=50 21.8% 30.9% 21.6% 28.3% 12.7% 13.0%
f=100 19.6% 29.8% 23.4% 26.9% 19.4% 27.1%
f=200 20.5% 27.9% 12.9% 13.4% 13.0% 13.9%
f=500 17.9% 28.6% 21.9% 25.3% 19.0% 23.2%
f=1000 12.1% 19.1% 17.5% 25.4% 15.1% 27.8%
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Table 3: mAP degradation by Recursive U-Net generated universal perturbations attack
e↵ect against YOLOv3
Densenet169 VGG16 VGG19
perturbation parameter(f) resize pile-up resize pile-up resize pile-up
f=10 19.3% 17.9% 19.3% 17.9% 19.1% 17.7%
f=50 19.3% 17.9% 19.3% 17.9% 19.1% 17.7%
f=100 19.3% 17.9% 19.3% 17.9% 19.1% 17.7%
f=200 19.3% 17.9% 19.3% 17.9% 19.1% 17.7%
f=500 19.3% 17.9% 19.3% 17.9% 19.1% 17.7%
f=1000 19.3% 17.9% 19.3% 17.9% 19.1% 17.7%
Table 2 and Table 3 show the quantitative attacking performance of the
transferability of universal perturbations on MS COCO 2014 validation set.
We use YOLOv3 as the target object detector here, and the original mAP
is 40.9%. From Table 2, we can see the attack performance of universal per-
turbations generated by ResNet generator is di↵erent when the generator is
trained on di↵erent numbers of classes of images. When we use Densenet169
as the target model to train the generator on the first 50 classes of im-
ages in ImageNet and add the perturbations to MS COCO validation set
through pile-up, we can reduce the mAP by 30.9%, and at this time, the
mAP of YOLOv3 is only 10%. At the same time we found an interesting
phenomenon, from Table 3 we can see that when we use recursive U-Net
network as the generator, the attack performance of universal perturbations
are the same, although the number of classes of images used during the train-
ing process of the generator is not the same, we speculate that this is due
to the recursive architecture of the generator. It can be seen from Figure 5
that using the transferability of universal perturbations to attack YOLOv3
can make it misclassify or hide the objects in the original images. The left
column is original images, and we can see that all the images are detected
correctly. The middle column is adversarial examples with resized perturba-
tions, “teddy bear” is misclassified as “dog”, “bed” and “bird” are hidden.
The right column is adversarial examples with pile-up perturbations, “teddy
bear”, “bed”, and “bird” are hidden. From the results, we can see that our
attack method is more suitable for object hiding.
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Figure 5: Attacks against YOLOv3 model when L1 = 20. The left column is original
images, the middle column is adversarial examples with resized perturbations, and the
right column is adversarial examples with pile-up perturbations.
4.2.2. Results on Faster R-CNN
We also consider ResNet and recursive U-Net generator to attack Faster
R-CNN. We attack Faster R-CNN on Pascal VOC 2007 test set, and the
generation process of the universal perturbations is the same as the attack
on YOLOv3. Table 4 and Table 5 show the attack e↵ect and Figure 6 depicts
the perturbations added to di↵erent input images.
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Table 4: mAP degradation by ResNet generated universal perturbations attack e↵ect
against Faster R-CNN
Densenet169 VGG16 VGG19
perturbation parameter(f) resize pile-up resize pile-up resize pile-up
f=10 28.0% 42.9% 28.2% 38.3% 33.2% 38.6%
f=50 29.4% 45.4% 26.9% 42.1% 23.5% 35.5%
f=100 31.1% 44.3% 29.8% 43.2% 25.3% 37.5%
f=200 30.8% 40.9% 24.2% 36.2% 23.7% 36.5%
f=500 25.2% 40.9% 27.8% 38.8% 28.5% 33.3%
f=1000 14.0% 21.1% 26.0% 35.1% 21.6% 31.6%
Table 5: mAP degradation by Recursive U-Net generated universal perturbations attack
e↵ect against Faster R-CNN
Densenet169 VGG16 VGG19
perturbation parameter(f) resize pile-up resize pile-up resize pile-up
f=10 26.2% 34.7% 26.2% 34.7% 26.4% 34.1%
f=50 26.2% 34.7% 26.2% 34.7% 26.4% 34.1%
f=100 26.2% 34.7% 26.2% 34.7% 26.4% 34.1%
f=200 26.2% 34.7% 26.2% 34.7% 26.4% 34.1%
f=500 26.2% 34.7% 26.2% 34.7% 26.4% 34.1%
f=1000 26.2% 34.7% 26.2% 34.7% 26.4% 34.1%
Table 4 and Table 5 show the quantitative attacking performance of the
transferability of universal perturbations on PASCAL VOC 2007 test set.
We use the Faster R-CNN as target object detector here, and the original
mAP is 69.5%. From Table 4 we can see that when we use Densenet169
as target model to train the generators on the first 50 classes of images in
ImageNet and add the perturbations to PASCAL VOC 2007 test set through
pile-up, we can reduce the mAP by 45.4%, and at this time, the mAP of
Faster R-CNN is only 24.1%. From Table 5 we can see that when we use
recursive U-Net network as the generator, the attack performance of universal
perturbations are the same, although the number of classes of images used
during the training process of the generator is not the same, we speculate
that this is due to the recursive architecture of the generator. And it can be
seen from Figure 6 that using the transferability of universal perturbations
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to attack Faster R-CNN can make it misclassify or hide the objects in the
original images. The left column is original images, and we can see that all
the images are detected correctly. The middle column is adversarial examples
with resized perturbations, “bird” and “boat” are hidden. The right column
is adversarial examples with pile-up perturbations, “bird” is misclassified as
“person”, “boat” is hidden. From the results, we can see that our attack
method is more suitable for object hiding.
Figure 6: Attacks against Faster R-CNN model when L1 = 20. The left column is
original images, the middle column is adversarial examples with resized perturbations,
and the right column is adversarial examples with pile-up perturbations.
Table 6: mAP degradation of YOLOv3 and Faster R-CNN
Densenet169 VGG16 VGG19
resize pile-up resize pile-up resize pile-up
YOLOv3 22.1% 30.9% 23.4% 28.3% 22.4% 27.8%
Faster R-CNN 31.1% 45.4% 29.8% 43.2% 33.2% 38.6%
In this section, we attack YOLOv3 and Faster R-CNN. As can be seen
from Table 6, when we use Densenet169 as the target model to train univer-
sal perturbation generators and add the universal perturbations to the target
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images through pile-up, we can get the strongest attack e↵ect. Universal per-
turbations in our method are more suitable for large size images. The mAP
degradation has verified the powerful attacking ability of the transferability
of universal perturbations both against the proposal-based detector (Faster
R-CNN) and the regression-based detector (YOLOv3). We believe that if we
use the advanced object detectors, the mAP will also degrade.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we find that the universal perturbations generated against
image classification tasks is transferable, and the adversarial attack is ex-
tended from image classification to object detection using the transferability
of universal perturbations. We successfully solve the problem that universal
perturbations cannot be directly applied to attack object detection models
through two methods: resizing and pile-up. Then, we attack the two rep-
resentative object detectors: regression-based YOLOv3 model and proposal-
based Faster R-CNN model, and reduce their mAP by 30.9% and 45.4%
respectively, demonstrating the great transferability of universal perturba-
tions between di↵erent object detector architectures. Our experiments imply
that using the transferability of universal perturbations can perform e↵ec-
tive attacks under black-box setup, i.e., even without the knowledge of the
targeted network’s architectures and parameters. It reveals the vulnerabil-
ity of the object detection models and reveals an interesting topic for future
research. The research works and proposed methods in this paper can be
powerful vulnerability testing means for object detection in AI. They can en-
hance the robustness and security of AI, especially the safety of autonomous
driving.
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